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Abstract
We present a device-independent randomness expansion protocol, involving only a con-
stant number of non-signaling quantum devices, that achieves infinite expansion: starting with
m bits of uniform private randomness, the protocol can produce an unbounded amount of
certified randomness that is exp(−Ω(m1/3))-close to uniform and secure against a quantum
adversary. The only parameters which depend on the size of the input are the soundness of
the protocol and the security of the output (both are inverse exponential in m). This settles a
long-standing open problem in the area of randomness expansion and device-independence.
The analysis of our protocols involves overcoming fundamental challenges in the study of
adaptive device-independent protocols. Our primary technical contribution is the design and
analysis of device-independent protocols which are Input Secure; that is, their output is guar-
anteed to be secure against a quantum eavesdropper, even if the input randomness was generated
by that same eavesdropper!
The notion of Input Security may be of independent interest to other areas such as device-
independent quantum key distribution.
1 Introduction
Bell’s Theorem states that the outcomes of local measurements on spatially separated systems
cannot be predetermined, due to the phenomenon of quantum entanglement [Bel64]. This is one
of the most important “no-go” results in physics because it rules out the possibility of a local
hidden variable theory that reproduces the predictions of quantum mechanics. However, Bell’s
Theorem has also found application in quantum information as a positive result, in that it gives
a way to certify the generation of genuine randomness: if measurement outcomes of separated
systems exhibit non-local correlations (e.g. correlations that violate so-called Bell Inequalities),
then the outcomes cannot be deterministic.
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While Bell’s Theorem does give a method to certify randomness, there is a caveat. The measure-
ment settings used on the separated systems have to be chosen at random! Nevertheless, it is
possible to choose the measurement settings in a randomness-efficient manner such that the mea-
surement outcomes certifiably contain more randomness (as measured by, say, min-entropy) than
the amount of randomness used as input. This is the idea behind randomness expansion protocols,
in which a classical experimenter, starting with m-bits of uniform randomness, can interact with
physically isolated devices to certifiably generate g(m) bits of (information theoretic) randomness
(ideally with g(m) ≫ m). Furthermore, these protocols are device-independent: the only assumption
made on the devices is that they cannot communicate, and obey the laws of quantum mechanics.
In particular, there is no a priori assumption on the internal structure or dynamics of the devices.
Indeed, the devices may even have been manufactured by an adversary!
First proposed by Colbeck [Col09] in 2006, device-independent randomness expansion has flour-
ished into an active area of research [CK11, PAM10, VV12a, FGS13, CVY13, AMP12, UZZ+13,
GL+13, MS14]. Its study has synthesized a diverse array of concepts from quantum informa-
tion theory, theoretical computer science, and quantum cryptography, including generalized Bell
inequalities [PAM10, AMP12, PM13, FGS13], the monogamy of entanglement [VV12a, RUV12],
randomness extractors [Ren08, KT08, DPVR12], and quantum key distribution [BHK05, MPA11,
VV12b, MS14]. Randomness expansion has even been experimentally realized by [PAM10], who
reported the generation of 42 bits of certified randomness (over the course of a month).
The fundamental problem in analyzing a randomness expansion protocol is in demonstrating a
lower bound on the amount of certified randomness, usually measured by min-entropy. There
have been a couple of different approaches. A line of works, starting with [PAM10], gives bounds
on the min-entropy by analytically relating the extent to which a Bell inequality is violated to
the “guessing probability” of the protocol’s output [PAM10, FGS13, AMP12, PM13]. Another ap-
proach, developed in [VV12a], is to utilize the operational definition ofmin-entropy in a “guessing
game”, which establishes that a low min-entropy output implies that the non-signaling devices
must have communicated during the protocol (a contradiction). This latter approach yields a pro-
tocol (which we will refer to as the Vazirani-Vidick protocol in this paper) that not only achieves
the state-of-the-art expansion factor g(m) = exp(m1/3), but is also quantum secure: that is, the out-
put contains high min-entropy even from the perspective of a malicious eavesdropper that may
be entangled with the protocol devices. Recently, a work by [MS14] not only achieves quantum
security, but randomness expansion that tolerates a constant level of noise in the devices.
The original protocol of [Col09, CK11] obtained g(m) = Θ(m), or linear expansion. This was
improved by Pironio et al. [PAM10] to achieve quadratic expansion g(m) = Θ(m2). The proto-
cols of [VV12a, FGS13, MS14] achieve exponential expansion. Perhaps the most tantalizing open
question in randomness expansion is: how large an expansion factor g(m) can we achieve? For
example, is there a protocol with expansion factor g(m) that is doubly-exponential in m? Is there
any upper bound on randomness expansion in general?
The only known upper bounds on randomness expansion apply to non-adaptive protocols with
two devices (i.e., where the referee’s inputs to the devices do not depend on their previous out-
puts) [CVY13]. There the authors showed that noise robust, non-adaptive protocols must have a
finite bound on their expansion factor1. With the exception of [FGS13], randomness expansion
protocols prior to our work were non-adaptive, and hence the results of [CVY13] suggest those
1They showed that g(m) ≤ exp(exp(m)), or a doubly-exponential upper bound.
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protocols have a bounded expansion factor. Thus, going beyond the the finite expansion barrier
appears to require adaptivity – but it could, a priori, be the case that even adaptive protocols are
inherently limited to finite randomness expansion.
We present an adaptive protocol that achieves infinite certifiable randomness expansion, using
a constant number of non-signaling quantum devices. The output length of our protocol de-
pends only on the number of rounds performed in the protocol (which can be arbitrarily large),
and not on the size of the initial random seed! This shows that there is no finite upper bound
on the expansion factor of adaptive protocols. Our protocol involves a constant number – eight,
specifically – of non-communicating black-box quantum devices, and guarantees that the output
of the protocol is close to uniformly random, even from the point of view of a quantum eaves-
dropper (where the closeness to uniformity is determined by the initial seed length). Our protocol
works even in the presence of arbitrary entanglement between the devices and an eavesdropper.
The key technical component of the analysis of the InfiniteExpansion protocol is to show that a sub-
protocol, which we call ClusterExpansion, is Input Secure: it generates uniform randomness secure
against a quantum adversary, even if that adversary generated the seed randomness earlier in the protocol!
Since the ClusterExpansion sub-protocol is Input Secure, composing ClusterExpansion with itself in
sequence (i.e. using the outputs of one instance of the protocol as the inputs of another instance)
yields another randomness expansion protocol, this time with much larger expansion factor. Our
InfiniteExpansion protocol is the infinite composition of the ClusterExpansion sub-protocol.
In Section 2.2, we discuss two relevant and enlightening results about randomness expansion [CSW14,
MS14], which were announced after the original posting of this work (though these results were
discovered independently and, unbeknownst to the authors, developed in parallel with thiswork).
We note here that any exponential randomness expansion protocol with security against a quan-
tum eavesdropper (such as the Vazirani-Vidick protocol, for example) readily yields a protocol
using 2N devices, which has a randomness expansion given by an exponential tower function
of N (i.e. 22
2...
2N
): after running such a quantum-secure expansion protocol on one pair of de-
vices, the devices are discarded, and their outputs are fed into a fresh pair of devices (that did not
communicate with any previous devices used in the protocol). This “exponential tower” protocol
terminates when all 2N devices have been used. This was first observed by [Yue13], and in [MS14]
it is noted that the robust exponential expansion protocol given therein can be used to obtain an
analogous “tower” randomness expansion protocol, which is also robust.
For all practical intents and purposes, a “tower” expansion protocol can certify much, much (...
muchmuch
much...
) more randomness than would ever be needed in practice, so one might consider
it effectively an “infinite” randomness expansion protocol. However, such a protocol avoids the
need to reuse devices, and hence sidesteps the need for Input Security – but secure device reuse is
the key conceptual issue that we find interesting!
Finally, the work [CSW14] serves as one very interesting example (discovered independently of
this work) of how the concept of Input Security is relevant to problems other than infinite ran-
domness expansion. We note that our result can be combined with a quantum-secure randomness
amplification protocol (for example [CSW14], or [BRG+13]) to produce an infinite randomness
amplification protocol.
3
1.1 Barriers to infinite randomness expansion
Here we identify the inherent technical challenges in analyzing any adaptive randomness expan-
sion protocol. In Section 2 we discuss how to overcome these challenges. Some of the technical
issues discussed here have been identified in previous work (e.g., [FGS13]) and in randomness
expansion folklore.
The Extractor Seed and Input Security Problems
In any adaptive randomness expansion scheme there is a stage when intermediate outputs of the
protocol are used to generate “derived” inputs for some devices in future stages of the protocol.
This creates an inherent difficulty in analyzing adaptive protocols, because the devices involved in
the protocol may adversarially take advantage of memory and shared entanglement to attempt to
create harmful correlations between intermediate outputs and the the internal state of the devices
that receive the “derived” inputs. To prove the correctness of an adaptive randomness expan-
sion protocol, one must show that the devices receiving these “derived” inputs cannot distinguish
them from inputs generated by a truly private random seed. Because of this fundamental chal-
lenge, there are very few analyses of adaptive randomness expansion protocols (or key distribu-
tion protocols for that matter) in the existing literature. Prior to our work, [FGS13] gave the only
analysis of an adaptive randomness expansion protocol. However, their analysis requires the as-
sumption that entanglement is only shared between certain pairs of devices, but otherwise that
the devices are unentangled.
In the general case where devices can share arbitrary entanglement and may be entangled with an
eavesdropper, we face the issue of the quantum security of the intermediate outputs against devices
that will receive the derived inputs2. This issue manifests itself in two different forms: the Input
Security Problem and the Extractor Seed Problem.
Generally, a randomness expansion protocol is comprised of two components: an expansion com-
ponent and an extractor component. The expansion component will generate an output string
that, while not necessarily close to uniformly random, will be guaranteed to have high min-
entropy. The extractor component will then take this high min-entropy source, as well as a small
polylogarithmic-sized uniformly random seed (taken, for example, from the initial seed of the ran-
domness expansion protocol), and convert the high min-entropy source into a string that is close
to uniform.
The Input Security Problem. In an adaptive protocol, we require that the output of the expansion
component contains high min-entropy relative to a quantum eavesdropper (i.e. high conditional min-
entropy) – where we treat the other devices in the protocol, collectively, as the eavesdropper.
However, the Vazirani-Vidick protocol – an quantum-secure exponential randomness expansion
protocol that produces an output with high conditional min-entropy3 – uses, in its analysis, an
assumption that the initial seed to the protocol is secure against the eavesdropper [VV12a]. This is
a condition that cannot be satisfied in an adaptive protocol. Suppose in an adaptive protocol some
device D produced an intermediate output X, which we use as the derived input to some other
device D′ as input randomness. Note that X is not secure against D. Hence, we cannot use the
analysis of [VV12a] as is and treat D as an eavesdropper, and argue that D′ produces an output Y
2We say that a string X is quantum secure, or simply secure, against an eavesdropper E if the joint state of the string
and eavesdropper ρXE is approximately equal to U|X| ⊗ ρE, where Um denotes the uniform distribution on |X| bits.
3Recent work by [MS14] gives another such protocol with quantum security. See Section 2.2 for more information.
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that is secure against D. We refer to this issue as the Input Security Problem.
The Extractor Seed Problem. Even supposing that we had an expansion component that was
immune to the Input Security Problem (i.e. produces output that contains high conditional min-
entropy despite the input being known to the eavesdropper), we would still suffer from a similar
problem with the extractor component. Here, we need to use a small polylogarithmic-sized uni-
form extractor seed to convert a source of high conditional min-entropy into a string that is nearly
uniform, relative to a quantum adversary.
First, note that we cannot always take the extractor seed from the original random seed to the
protocol, because this would limit us to exponential randomness expansion. Thus to achieve
super-exponential expansion, the extractor seed must eventually be generated by intermediate
outputs of the protocol.
Secondly, the existing quantum-secure extractors in the literature (e.g., see [DPVR12, KT08, Ren08])
require that the extractor seed be secure against the quantum eavesdropper. As pointed out
by [FGS13], provably satisfying this requirement in an adaptive randomness expansion proto-
col involves overcoming a technical difficulty similar to that of the Input Security Problem. We
refer to this technical barrier as the Extractor Seed Problem.
To summarize, in order to obtain quantum security of the output against an eavesdropper E,
current quantum-secure expansion protocols and extraction procedures require the strong as-
sumption that the joint state of the seed, the devices, and the eavesdropper ρSDE is such that
ρSDE ≈ U|S| ⊗ ρDE, where U|S| denotes the uniform distribution on |S| bits, and ρDE denotes the
internal state of the devices and adversary. In order to solve the Input Security and Extractor Seed
Problems, we require randomness expansion protocols and extraction schemes that work with the
weaker assumption that ρSD ≈ U|S| ⊗ ρD – with no mention of the eavesdropper! – while still
obtaining the same quantum-security guarantees. We call this property Input Security, and say
that protocols with this property are Input Secure.
It is interesting to note that extractors, by themselves, cannot satisfy a property like Input Security
(i.e. we cannot guarantee that an extractor will produce private randomness when the seed is
prepared by the adversary)4.
The primary conceptual contribution of our paper is the design and analysis of the first random-
ness expansion protocols and extraction schemes that are (provably) Input Secure.
The Conditioning Security Problem
The output guarantees of a randomness expansion protocol only hold conditioned on the protocol
succeeding (i.e. conditioned on the event that the referee does not abort). Thus, the analysis of the
security properties of the output of a protocol must take into account the fact that conditioning can
skew the distribution of the output. Adversarially designed devices may, for example, coordinate
to pass the protocol only when the first bit of the output is “1”. This alone does not harm the
min-entropy of the output by much, but suggests that there could be other strategies employed by
adversarial devices to significantly weaken the security of the output. In [VV12a], they show that
such a collusion strategy would imply that the eavesdropper and the devices could communicate
with each other, a contradiction. However, this analysis again relies on the assumption that the
4Here’s a counter-example: let D be an n-bit source that is uniformly random. Let S be a O(log n)-bit seed that is
uniform and independent of D. Let E denote the string (S, first bit of Ext(D, S)). The min-entropy of D with respect to
E is at least n− 1, and S is uniform and independent of D. However, the output of the extractor is not secure against E.
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initial seed is secure against the eavesdropper. When analyzing an Input Secure protocol, we
cannot use this assumption, so resolving this Conditioning Security Problem requires different
techniques.
The Compounding Error Problem
Another technical concern is the problem of error accumulation in an adaptive protocol. When
using intermediate outputs to generate derived inputs for later stages in the protocol, we can only
assume, at best, that the derived inputs are approximately secure and uniform. Furthermore, these
errors will accumulate over the course of the protocol, and in an infinite expansion protocol, this
accumulation could grow so large that the protocol will fail to work at some point. Depending
on how one measures the security of a string against an quantum eavesdropper, errors may not
accumulate in a linear fashion – as pointed out by [KRBM07], even if the accessible information
of a string relative to an eavesdropper (which has been used as a standard security measure in
quantum key distribution) is small, a tiny piece of classical side information could completely
break the security of the string. Such an ill-behaved measure of quantum security would severely
complicate the analysis of an adaptive randomness protocol.
2 Results
We present a protocol that attains infinite randomness expansion. Our protocol, which we denote
the InfiniteExpansion protocol, involves a constant number of non-signaling devices (eight, specif-
ically) that, with m bits of seed randomness, can produce an arbitrarily large amount of certified
randomness. In particular, starting with m bits of random seed, if InfiniteExpansion is run for k it-
erations, the output of the k iterations is a random string that is exp(−Ω(m1/3))-close to uniform,
and has length
22
··2
Ω(m1/3)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
,
i.e., a k-height tower of exponentials inm. The initial seed lengthm controls soundness parameters
of the protocol, but has no bearing on the amount of certified output randomness!
Our protocol uses as subroutines the exponential expansion protocol of [VV12a] (which we denote
VV)5, and the sequential CHSH game protocol of Reichardt, et al. [RUV12] (which we denote
RUV). See Section 4 for more detail on these sub-protocols. We describe the protocol below, both
algorithmically and schematically (see Figure 1).
5We implicitly include the extraction procedure as part of the VV protocol, where the extractor seed is taken from
the input seed of the VV protocol.
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VV
RUV
VV
RUV
S
Ti Ti+1
X Y
Figure 1: The InfiniteExpansion protocol. All arrows indicate classical operations performed by the referee.
S denotes the initial seed to the protocol, and Ti denotes the output of the protocol at the ith iteration. Each
of the VV and RUV boxes involve two devices, for a total of eight devices used in the protocol.
Non-signaling devices: D1, . . . ,D8.
Initial seed randomness: S ∼ Um.
1. Let X1 ← S.
2. For i = 1, 2, 3, . . .
(a) Yi ← VV(D1,D2,Xi).
(b) Zi ← RUV(D3,D4,Yi).
(c) Wi ← VV(D5,D6,Zi).
(d) Xi+1 ← RUV(D7,D8,Wi).
Figure 2: The algorithmic specification of the InfiniteExpansion protocol. VV(A, B,X) (resp. RUV(A, B,X))
denotes executing the VV (resp. RUV) sub-protocol with devices A and B using seed randomness X (for
more details about these sub-protocols see Section 4). The Xi, Yi, Zi, and Wi registers are all classical, and
managed by the referee.
The main result of this paper is the following theorem, stated informally here (for the formal
version see Theorems 5.2 and 5.1):
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Theorem 2.1 (Infinite randomness expansion, informal). Let D = {D1, . . . ,D8} denote eight non-
signaling quantum devices. Let E be an arbitrary quantum system that may be entangled with the Di’s, but
cannot communicate with them. Suppose that a classical referee executes the InfiniteExpansion protocol with
the {Di} devices, using an m-bit random seed S that is secure against the devices {Di}. Then, for all k ∈ N,
if Pr(Protocol has not aborted by round k) = exp(−O(m1/3)), then the output Tk of the protocol, condi-
tioned on not aborting after k rounds, is exp(−Ω(m1/3))-secure against E, and has length Ω(g(k)(m)),
where g(k) denotes the k-fold composition of the function g : N → N, defined as g(m) = exp(Ω(m1/3)).
Furthermore, there exists a quantum strategy for the devices such that, with high probability, they do not
abort the protocol at any round.
The analysis of the InfiniteExpansion protocol overcomes the challenges described in the previous
section. We now give an overview of how we solve them.
2.1 Our proof strategy
Solving the Extractor Seed and Input Security Problems. The key technique for solving both the
Extractor Seed and Input Security Problems is a powerful result of Reichardt, Unger, and Vazi-
rani [RUV12], which is based on the phenomenon of CHSH game rigidity. The CHSH game is
a two-player game in which a classical referee chooses two input bits x and y uniformly at ran-
dom, and gives them to non-communicating players Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob produce binary
outputs a and b, and they win the game if a⊕ b = x ∧ y. If Alice and Bob employ classical strate-
gies, they cannot win the CHSH game with probability exceeding 75%, but using shared quantum
entanglement, there is a quantum strategy that allows them to win the game with probability
cos2(pi/8) ≈ 85%. The CHSH game is frequently used in the study of quantum entanglement and
non-locality. More relevantly, it also serves as the basis for many randomness expansion protocols
in the literature: protocols will often test for Bell inequality violations by measuring how often
devices win the CHSH game.
The famous Tsirelson’s Theorem states that cos2(pi/8) is the optimal winning probability using
quantum strategies. Even more remarkable is that the CHSH game is rigid: there is essentially a
unique quantum strategy that achieves this optimum. That is, any quantum strategy that achieves
cos2(pi/8) winning probability must be, in a specific sense, isomorphic to the “canonical” CHSH
strategy which involves Alice and Bob making specific measurements on separate halves of an
EPR pair6 (whichwewill call the ideal CHSH strategy). Furthermore, CHSHgame rigidity is robust:
any strategy that achieves cos2(pi/8) − ε winning probability must be isomorphic to a strategy
that is O(
√
ε)-close to the ideal CHSH strategy. A form of CHSH game rigidity was first proved
by Mayers and Yao in the exact case [MY03] and later made robust by [MYS12, MS13].
Reichardt et al. proved a far-reaching generalization of CHSH game rigidity to the situation where
Alice and Bob play N independent CHSH games in sequence. This can be viewed as a larger
game CHSH⊗N , where Alice and Bob win CHSH⊗N if they win approximately cos2(pi/8)N games.
Reichardt et al. prove the following theorem, stated informally here (for the precise version see
[RUV12] Theorem 5.38, or Theorem 2.8 in this paper), which they call sequential CHSH game rigid-
ity:
6The EPR pair state is defined as |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉).
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Theorem 2.2 (Sequential CHSH game rigidity, informal version). Suppose Alice and Bob play N
instances of the CHSH game, where the inputs to Alice and Bob in each instance are uniform and inde-
pendent of each other. Divide the N instances into N/t blocks of t games each, where t = N1/α for some
universal constant α > 1. If Alice and Bob use a strategy that, with high probability, wins approximately
cos2(pi/8)N instances, then in most blocks, Alice and Bob’s strategy is approximately isomorphic to the
ideal sequential strategy, in which the ideal CHSH strategy is applied t times in sequence to t EPR pairs
that are in tensor product with each other.
Sequential CHSH game rigidity is a powerful tool that allows one to characterize the behavior
of separated quantum devices, simply from observing the correlations between their (classical)
inputs and outputs. Reichardt et al. use sequential CHSH games as a primitive in a more general
protocol that allows a classical computer to command non-signaling quantum devices to perform
arbitrary quantum computation – and verify that this computation has been performed correctly!
Here, in contrast, our goal is much more modest: we simply want to command non-signaling
quantum devices to generate uniformly random bits.
The CHSH⊗N game already yields a protocol that produces certified randomness. In particular,
we have two non-signaling devices play N games of CHSH. The referee will check whether the
devices won approximately cos2(pi/8)N games. If so, the referee will select a block of t games at
random, and use the output of one of the devices in that block of t games be the protocol’s output
– call this the RUV protocol.
We know from Theorem 2.2 that, with high probability, the outputs of the RUV protocol were gen-
erated by a strategy approximating the ideal sequential strategy. The ideal sequential strategy is
the ideal CHSH measurement repeatedly applied to a tensor product of EPR pairs, so the mea-
surement outcomes are necessarily in tensor product with an eavesdropper. Thus the outputs of
RUV are approximately secure against a quantum adversary. The problem, of course, is that the
amount of randomness needed by the referee to run this RUV protocol is much greater than the
amount of certified randomness in the output (Θ(N) versus N1/α). So we can’t use RUV by itself
as a randomness expansion scheme.
However, sequential CHSH game rigidity offers more than just the guarantee of secure uniform
randomness; observe that it does not need to assume that the inputs to the N CHSH games were secure
against an eavesdropper – only that it was secure against the devices playing the CHSH games! This
is precisely the Input Security property.
Thus, we can use the RUV protocol as a “scrambling” procedure that transforms an input that may
not be secure against an eavesdropper into a shorter string that is secure against an eavesdropper.
Recall that, because of the Input Security and Extractor Seed Problems, the output of the VV sub-
protocol in the InfiniteExpansion protocol may not be secure against other devices (namely, the
devices that produced the input to the VV sub-protocol). However, if we invoke the RUV protocol
on the outputs of VV, we obtain secure outputs that can be used as input randomness for another
VV instance.
Furthermore, observe that we still have achieved randomness expansion: the VV protocol attains
exponential expansion, and the RUV protocol will only shrink that by a polynomial amount.
Solving the Conditioning Security Problem. The main technical contribution of our paper is
solving the Conditioning Security Problem. While combining the VV and RUV protocols concep-
tually yields an Input Secure randomness expansion protocol, there still is the technical issue of
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whether this protocol is Input Secure when we condition on the RUV protocol succeeding. There
are simple examples that show that adversarial devices can, via conditioning, skew the distribu-
tion of their outputs, and even introduce entanglement between some bits of their outputs and an
eavesdropper, despite most outputs having been produced by an ideal strategy. The Sequential
CHSH Game Rigidity Theorem of [RUV12] does not take conditioning into account, because it is
assumed that the devices pass the RUV protocol with probability extremely close to 1.
Here, we assume the RUV protocol passes with some small probability that is inverse polynomial
in the number of games played, and show that the RUV protocol manages to obtain an approxi-
mately secure output conditioned on the protocol succeeding. We prove this in Lemma 5.5, and
our proof employs tools from quantum information theory. Our approach is reminiscent of that
used in the proofs of the classical Parallel Repetition Theorem (see, e.g., [Hol07]).
Solving the compounding error problem. We use the strongest definition of the quantum secu-
rity of a string against an eavesdropper: namely, a string X is (approximately) secure against an
eavesdropper E iff the trace distance between the joint state ρXE and the ideal state U|X| ⊗ ρE is
small, where where U|X| denotes the uniform distribution on |X| bits. To solve the compound-
ing error problem, we first show that the errors incurred at each iteration of the InfiniteExpansion
protocol accumulate linearly – this is because the trace distance satisfies the triangle inequality.
Then, we show that the error added at iteration k is exponentially smaller than the error of iteration
k − 1. Thus, the infinite sum of errors converges to a constant multiple of the error incurred by
the first iteration, which is exponentially small in the seed lengthm. Hence we avoid the potential
problems raised by [KRBM07].
2.2 Related work
Here we discuss some relevant recent developments in the area of randomness expansion and am-
plification, which were announced after the original posting of this work. We note, however, that
the results in the following works were discovered independently of the results in this work, and
their relationship to each other was only realized after both works were essentially complete. In
the following description we will occasionally use the terminology of this paper to restate results
of these other works, though those papers used different terminology in the original statements.
In independent work by Chung, Shi, and Wu [CSW14], the problem of Input Security was also
studied, and played a key role in their construction of a device-independent protocol to amplify
randomness, starting with any min-entropy source. The authors require an Input Secure random-
ness expansion protocol to use as a building block for their amplification protocol. They prove an
elegant result called the Equivalence Lemma, which may be informally summarized as follows
(see [CSW14] for a formal statement):
Consider a device-independent randomness expansion protocol P, that starts with a seed S, uni-
form and in tensor product with the devices D involved in the protocol, as well as a quantum
adversary E, and produces an output string X that is certifiably close to uniform and in tensor
product with E and S. The Equivalence Lemma states that any such protocol P also certifies out-
put randomness X with the same security guarantees, without requiring that S is in tensor product
with E — in other words, any such protocol P is also Input Secure. In particular, this proves that
the Vazirani-Vidick protocol (when implemented in composition with a strong quantum extrac-
tor) is, in fact, Input Secure, and can be composed with itself to perform unbounded randomness
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expansion in the same manner as we do here, without requiring the use of the RUV protocol.
Secondly, another independent work of Miller and Shi [MS14] gives the first provably robust pro-
tocol for randomness expansion (and, in fact, gives robust exponential expansion). Combining
the main result of [MS14] with Equivalence Lemma of [CSW14], allows one to obtain a provably
robust infinite expansion protocol requiring only four non-communicating devices.
It is interesting to note that extractors (which have a similar input-output structure to random-
ness expansion protocols) cannot possess an analogous Input Security. Thus, there is no natural
analogue of the Equivalence Lemma which will work for extractors. In this sense, the Equiva-
lence Lemma represents an interesting phenomenon or property which is possessed by device
independent (quantum) protocols, but not by (classical) protocols such as extractors.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Notation
We write [N] for the set of integers {1, . . . ,N}. For a Hilbert space H, let D(H) denote the set of
density matrices onH. The classical state ρX corresponding to a discrete classical random variable
X is defined as ∑x Pr(X = x)|x〉〈x| (where x ranges over the computational basis states). For a
discrete classical random variable X, we use |X| to denote X’s length in bits. A classical-quantum
state (or cq-state) ρXB ∈ D(HX ⊗HB) is a density matrix where ρXB = ∑x px|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB, where
px are probabilities and {|x〉} is an orthonormal basis for HX . We write 1N to denote the N × N
identity matrix. We write Um to denote the density matrix 2
−m
12m (i.e. the completely mixed state
of dimension 2m). For an arbitrary matrix A, we let ‖A‖tr := 12 tr
√
A†A denote its trace norm (also
known as its Schatten 1-norm).
Definition 3.1 (Secure cq-state). Let E be an arbitrary quantum system. Let ρXE be a cq-state. For state
ρXE, X is ζ-secure against E iff
‖ρXE −U|X| ⊗ ρE‖tr ≤ ζ.
3.2 Quantum information theory
For completeness we present a few key definitions and facts of quantum information theory that
will be useful for us later. For a more comprehensive reference we refer the reader to, e.g., [NC10,
Wil13].
For a density matrix ρ, its von Neumann entropy is defined as H(ρ) := −tr(ρ log ρ). For a den-
sity matrix ρAB ∈ D(HA ⊗HB), the conditional von Neumann entropy is defined as H(A|B)ρ :=
H(AB)ρ − H(B)ρ where H(AB)ρ = H(ρAB) and H(B)ρ = H(ρB). The quantum mutual informa-
tion between A and B of ρAB is defined as I(A : B)ρ := H(A)ρ − H(A|B)ρ. The conditional quan-
tummutual information I(A : B|C)ρ for a tripartite state ρABC is defined as H(A|C)ρ−H(A|B,C)ρ.
We will usually omit the subscript ρ when the state is clear from context.
We now list a few useful facts about these quantum information-theoretic quantities. Proofs of the
following facts can be found in, e.g., [Wil13].
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Fact 3.2. 1. Let X be a discrete random variable, and let ρX be its associated classical state. Then
H(ρX) = H(X), where H(X) is the Shannon entropy of X.
2. (Conditioning reduces entropy) Let ρAB ∈ D(HA ⊗HB). Then H(A|B)ρ ≤ H(A)ρ.
3. (Chain rule) Let ρABC ∈ D(HA ⊗HB ⊗HC). Then
I(A : BC)ρ = I(A : B)ρ + I(A : C|B)ρ.
4. (Pinsker’s inequality) Let ρAB ∈ D(HA ⊗HB). Then
‖ρAB − ρA ⊗ ρB‖2tr ≤ 2I(A : B)ρ.
Finally, we define quantum min-entropy. Let ρAB be a bipartite density matrix. The min-entropy
of A conditioned on B is defined as
Hmin(A|B)ρ := max{λ ∈ R : ∃σB ∈ D(HB) s.t. 2−λ1A ⊗ σB ≥ ρAB}.
Let ε > 0. Then ε-smoothed min-entropy of A conditioned on B is defined as
Hεmin(A|B)ρ := max
ρ˜AB∈B(ρAB,ε)
Hmin(A|B)ρ˜,
where B(ρAB, ε) is the set of sub-normalized density matrices within trace distance ε of ρAB. For a
detailed reference on quantum min-entropy, we refer the reader to [Ren08].
3.3 Modelling protocols and input robustness
In this paper, wewill consider several different randomness expansion procedures (e.g., the Vazirani-
Vidick protocol, or the RUV protocol); a crucial element of our analysis is that these protocols are
all input robust in the sense that slight deviations from uniformity in their input seed only mildly
affect the expansion guarantees that we get when assuming the seed is perfectly uniform. To
make this input robustness property formal, we introduce the quantum operation description of
randomness expansion protocols.
In general, a randomness expansion protocol is an interaction between a classical referee R and a
quantum device D, that is entirely unconstrained, except that D consists of two or more isolated,
non-signaling sub-devices (but the sub-devices may be entangled).
The important Hilbert spaces we will consider are:
1. (Pass/No Pass Flag). HF denotes a two-dimensional Hilbert space that the referee will use
to indicate whether it accepts or rejects the interaction.
2. (Protocol seed). HS denotes the 2m-dimensional Hilbert space that corresponds to the (pri-
vate) m-bit seed randomness that the referee will use for its interaction with the device D.
3. (Protocol output). HX denotes the Hilbert space that corresponds to the output of the device
D 7.
7Since D always consists of non-signaling subdevices, we will arbitrarily declare one of the sub-devices’ output to
be the output of the overall device D.
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4. (Device internal state). HD denotes the Hilbert space corresponding to the internal state of
the device D.
5. (Eavesdropper). HE denotes the Hilbert space corresponding to a potential quantum eaves-
dropper, which may be entangled with device D.
We can view a randomness expansion protocol as a quantum operation E acting on states in the
space HF ⊗HS ⊗HX ⊗HD. Of the Hilbert spaces listed above, device D only has access to the
Hilbert spaceHD; the other Hilbert spaces get updated by the referee’s interaction with D (except
for HE which is controlled by the eavesdropper). For example, the referee, by interacting with D,
will write D’s outputs to register X. The states in the Hilbert spaces HF, HS, and HX will always
be classical mixed states (i.e. diagonal in the computational basis).
More precisely, let P be a randomness expansion protocol. We will model P as a quantum opera-
tion E acting on an initial state ρiFSXD in the space HF ⊗HS ⊗HX ⊗HD, where ρiD is the internal
state of D before the protocol starts, and ρiFSX is prepared by the referee. E will be some uni-
tary map VP applied to the joint state ρ
i
FSXD. Now, define the quantum operation F that takes a
state ρFSXD, and produces the post-measurement state of ρFSXD conditioned on measuring |1〉 in
the F register, and then traces out the F and S registers, leaving ρXD|F=1. We define FE to be the
composition of the two quantum operations E , followed by F . Throughout this paper, we will
decorate density matrices by superscripts i and f to denote the states before and after the proto-
col, respectively. For example, we will often let ρ
f
FSXD denote the state of the FSXD system after
the execution of the protocol, conditioned on the protocol succeeding (i.e. F = 1).
The completeness and soundness of protocol P are statements about the post-measurement state
FE ⊗ 1E(ρiFSXDE) (where 1E is the identity on HE), argued only with respect to an ideal initial
state ρiFSXDE such that ρ
i
FSXD := |0〉〈0|F ⊗Um ⊗ |0〉〈0|X ⊗ ρiD , (or, depending on the analysis, the
stronger assumption that ρiFSXDE := |0〉〈0|F ⊗Um ⊗ |0〉〈0|X ⊗ ρiDE). In other words, the initial seed
is assumed to be perfectly uniform and unentangled with the device D. However, we also have
a form of input robustness: if the initial state were instead δ-close in trace distance to the ideal
initial state defined above, then we would obtain the same output parameters as P, up to an δ/λ
additive factor in trace distance, where λ is the probability that |1〉 is measured in the F register.
We prove this formally in Lemma 3.3 below.
Lemma 3.3. Let D be a device, and E an arbitrary quantum system that may be entangled with D. Let
σFSX := |0〉〈0|F ⊗U|S|⊗ |0〉〈0|X . Let the quantum operations F , E , and FE be defined as above. Suppose
for all states σFSXDE such that σFSXD = σFSX ⊗ σD, there exists a state τXDE such that τXE = U|X| ⊗ σE
and
‖FE ⊗ 1E(σFSXDE)− τXDE‖tr ≤ ε.
Let δ,λ > 0. Let ρiFSXDE be such that ‖ρiFSXDE − σFSXDE‖tr ≤ δ for a state σFSXDE where σFSXD =
|0〉〈0|F ⊗U|S|⊗ |0〉〈0|X ⊗ σD. Suppose that the probability of measuring |1〉 in the F register for the state
E ⊗ 1E(ρiFSXDE) is at least λ. Then, there exists a state µXDE such that µXE = U|X| ⊗ µE and
‖ρ fXDE − µXDE‖tr ≤ ε + δ/λ,
where ρ
f
XDE := FE ⊗ 1E(ρiFSXDE).
The proof of Lemma 3.3 is deferred to Appendix A.
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3.4 The Vazirani-Vidick protocol and quantum-secure extractors
Vazirani and Vidick exhibit a protocol that involves two non-signaling quantum devices and a
classical referee, that achieves randomness expansion that is secure against a quantum eavesdrop-
per [VV12a, Protocol B]. We record a formulation of their result as it will be used by us here:
Theorem 3.4 (Vazirani-Vidick protocol [VV12a]). There exists a protocol P with the following proper-
ties. Let D1 and D2 be arbitrary non-signaling quantum devices. Let E be an arbitrary quantum system,
possibly entangled with D1 and D2, but cannot communicate with D1 and D2 once the protocol begins. The
protocol, executed with devices D1 and D2, has the following properties:
1. (Output length). The output of the protocol has length n(m) = exp(Cm1/3), for some constant C;
2. (Completeness). There exists a non-signaling quantum strategy for D1 and D2 to pass the protocol
with probability 1− exp(−Ω(m2/3));
3. (Soundness). If the initial joint state ρiSD1D2E of the seed S, devices D1,D2, and eavesdropper E is
such that ρiSD1D2E = Um ⊗ ρiD1D2E, then if Pr(Protocol succeeds) ≥ ε, we have that
Hε∞(X|E)ρ f ≥ h(m),
where ε = ε(m), and ρ
f
XE denotes the joint state of device D1’s output and E, conditioned on the
protocol succeeding.
where h(m) := exp(C′m1/3) and ε(m) := 1/h(m), for a universal constant C′.
Another important primitive we will use is a quantum-secure extractor.
Definition 3.5 (Quantum-secure extractor). A function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}r is a (h, ε)-
quantum-secure extractor iff for all cq-states ρXE classical on n-bit strings X with H∞(X|E)ρ ≥ h, and for
uniform seed S secure against X and E (that is, the joint state ρXES is such that ρXES = ρXE ⊗ Ud), we
have ∥∥ρExt(X,S)ES−Ur ⊗ ρES∥∥tr ≤ ε,
where ρExt(X,S)ES denotes the joint cqc-state on the extractor output, quantum side information E, and the
seed S.
Theorem 3.6 ([DPVR12]). For all positive integers n, r, there exists a functionQExt : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d →
{0, 1}r that is a (r+O(log r) +O(log 1/ε), ε)-quantum-secure extractor where d = O(log2(n/ε) log r).
3.5 Sequential CHSH game rigidity
We can view a sequence of N CHSH games, played by non-signaling quantum devices D1,D2, as
a protocol CHSH⊗N, where the referee uses a private random seed S to generate inputs Ai, Bi ∈
{0, 1} to the devices D1 and D2, and obtains their respective outputs Xi,Yi ∈ {0, 1} for each round
i ∈ [N]. The protocol succeeds ifW, the number of rounds i such that Xi ⊕ Yi = Ai ∧ Bi, is at least
(cos2(pi/8)−O( logN√
N
))N.
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Divide the N rounds of the CHSH⊗N protocol into blocks of t consecutive games each, where t =
⌊N1/α⌋ for some fixed constant α. Let X be the output register of device D1. Let Xi denote the
t-qubit register of the ith block of X.
We paraphrase the sequential CHSH game rigidity theorem of [RUV12] here. In the theorem, we
imagine that for each block of games, the devices D1, D2 apply some local quantum operation on
their respective systems to produce outputs for the block. We call the quantum operation applied
in each block i their block strategy for i. We say that a block strategy is ζ-ideal if there is a local
isometry I under which their quantum operation E and the state acted upon by E are together
ζ-close to the ideal CHSH strategy (for a precise definition of ζ-ideal strategies, see [RUV12]). The
main property of ζ-ideal strategy that we will use is the following:
Lemma 3.7. Let D1,D2 be non-signaling quantum devices. Suppose that D1 and D2 participate in the
CHSH⊗N protocol. Let E be an arbitrary quantum system that may be entangled with D1, D2, but cannot
communicate with them once the CHSH⊗N protocol begins. Let Ii be the indicator random variable denoting
whether D1 and D2’s block strategy for block i is ζ-ideal. Let Xi be the output of block i. Then,
‖ρXiE|Ii=1 −Un ⊗ ρE|Ii=1‖tr ≤ ζ,
where ρXiE|Ii=1 denotes the joint state of Xi and E, conditioned on the event Ii = 1.
Proof. This is straightforward given the definition of ζ-ideal strategy. See [RUV12, Definitions 5.4,
5.5 and 5.37] for more detail.
Theorem 3.8 (Sequential CHSH game rigidity; Theorem 5.38 of [RUV12]). Let D1,D2 be non-
signaling quantum devices. Suppose that D1 and D2 participate in the CHSH
⊗N protocol. Let E be an
arbitrary quantum system that may be entangled with D1, D2, but cannot communicate with them once the
CHSH⊗N protocol begins. Let W be the total number of CHSH games that D1 and D2 win in the protocol.
Let X be the output of D1. Fix ε > 0, and let G ≤ N/t be the total number of blocks i such that the strategy
employed by D1 and D2 in block i is κ∗t−κ∗-ideal, where κ∗ > 1 is a universal constant. Then,
Pr(W ≥ cos2(pi/8)N − 1
2
√
2
√
N logN and G ≤ (1− ν)N/t) ≤ 1
t2
,
where ν = (12/
√
2)
√
logNt/N1/4, and t > 85.
Proof. This is Theorem 5.38 of [RUV12], instantiated with the parameter settings used in Theorem
5.39.
4 The Protocol
In this sectionwe formally define the protocol for infinite certifiable randomness expansion, which
we call the InfiniteExpansion protocol. The protocol uses eight non-signaling devices, which may
all share entanglement, but cannot communicate with each other. The devices are partitioned into
twoExpansion Clusters C0 and C1with four devices each. In each iteration, the InfiniteExpansion pro-
tocol alternates between clusters C0 and C1, performing a sub-protocol called ClusterExpansion. The
output of one cluster is used as seed randomness for the next invocation of the ClusterExpansion
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sub-protocol with the other cluster. Only the first iteration requires some seed randomness, to
“jumpstart” the randomness expansion process.
InfiniteExpansion Protocol
Non-signaling Clusters: C0, C1.
Initial seed randomness: S ∼ Um.
1. Let X1 ← S.
2. For i = 1, 2, 3, . . .
(a) Xi+1 ← ClusterExpansion(Ci,Xi).
(b) If ClusterExpansion aborts, then abort the entire protocol, otherwise continue.
Figure 3: The InfiniteExpansion protocol. The classical registers Xi are maintained by the referee, and Ci de-
notes cluster Ci mod 2. Xi+1 ← ClusterExpansion(Ci,Xi) denotes executing the ClusterExpansion sub-protocol
with the devices in cluster Ci, using Xi as the seed randomness, and storing the sub-protocol output in
register Xi+1.
We now specify the sub-protocol ClusterExpansion(C, S) for a 4-device cluster C and seed random-
ness S. As discussed earlier, two devices of a cluster Cwill be used to perform the Vazirani-Vidick
near-exponential randomness expansion protocol, and the other two will be used to perform a
variant of the CHSH⊗N protocol, which we call the RUV protocol.
ClusterExpansion(C, S) Sub-Protocol
Input Non-signaling Devices: C := {D1,D2, E1, E2}.
Input seed randomness: S
1. Y ← VV(D1,D2, S).
2. Z ← RUV(E1, E2,Y).
3. If either of the above instances of VV or RUV aborts, then abort ClusterExpansion.
Otherwise continue.
4. Output Z.
It is important that no subset of these devices can communicate with (signal to) any other subset
of the devices throughout the course of the subroutine. We now give precise definitions of the VV
and RUV sub-protocols.
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4.1 The VV sub-protocol
The VV sub-protocol consists of performing Protocol B from [VV12a], and then applying a ran-
domness extractor to the output of Protocol B. For any s, Protocol B takes in a uniformly ran-
dom s-bit seed, and conditioned on the protocol succeeding, produces a string of length n(s) =
exp(Ω(s1/3)) with h(s) = exp(Ω(s1/3)) bits of (smoothed) min-entropy (see Theorem 3.4). We
give a detailed account of the particular parameter settings we use for Protocol B in Appendix C.
We use the QExt randomness extractor given by Theorem 3.6. More formally, by QExtn,r,ε we
denote the (r +O(log r) +O(log 1/ε), ε)-quantum-secure extractor mapping {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d to
{0, 1}r , where d = d(n, r, ε) = O(log2(n/ε) log r).
For all s, theVV sub-protocol takes in a s-bit seed S, and outputs v(s) bits, where v(s) := exp(Ω(s1/3))
(for more detail, see Appendix C).
VV(A, B, S) Sub-Protocol
Input Non-signaling Devices: A, B
Input Seed : S
1. Let S1 be the first ⌊s/2⌋ bits of S, and S2 be the last ⌊s/2⌋ bits of S, where s := |S|.
2. Perform Protocol B of [VV12a] with devices A and B, using S1 as seed randomness,
and store Protocol B’s output in register Y.
3. If Protocol B aborts, then abort VV. Otherwise, continue.
4. Output QExtn,r,ε(Y, S2), where n = n(⌊s/2⌋), r = v(s), and ε = 1/h(⌊s/2⌋).
Figure 4: The VV sub-protocol. The functions n(s) and h(s) denote the output length and min-entropy
lower bound of Protocol B in Theorem 3.4 on s bits of seed.
4.2 The RUV sub-protocol
The RUV sub-protocol, using a random seed S, has two devices (call them A and B) play a number
N of sequential CHSH games, where N is a function of |S|, and the inputs to the devices in each
of the CHSH games are determined by half of S. The RUV sub-protocol aborts if they do not win
nearly≈ cos2(pi/8) fraction of games. Then, the other half of S is used to select a random sub-block
of A’s outputs in the N CHSH games, and the sub-block is produced as the output of RUV.
More precisely, let X ∈ {0, 1}N denote A’s outputs. Divide X into blocks of t consecutive bits,
and further subdivide each block into
√
t sub-blocks of
√
t bits each. We set t = ⌊N1/α⌋, where
α := ⌈16κ2∗⌉ and κ∗ is the constant from [RUV12, Theorem 5.7].
For all s, the RUV sub-protocol takes in a s-bit seed S, and outputs r(s) bits, where r(s) :=
⌊(s/4)1/(2α)⌋.
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RUV(A, B, S) Sub-Protocol
Input Non-signaling Devices: A, B
Input Seed : S
1. Let S1 be the first ⌊s/2⌋ bits of S, and S2 be the last ⌊s/2⌋ bits of S, where s := |S|.
2. Let a, b ∈ {0, 1}⌊s/4⌋ be the first and last halves of S1, respectively.
3. For i = 1, . . . ,N, where N := ⌊s/4⌋:
(a) Input ai, bi to devices A and B respectively, and collect outputs xi, yi ∈ {0, 1}
from A and B respectively.
4. LetW be the number of indices i such that xi ⊕ yi = ai ∧ bi. If
W < cos2(pi/8)N − 1
2
√
2
√
N logN,
then abort RUV. Otherwise, continue.
5. Output Z, the
√
t-bit string that is the jth sub-block of the ith block of X, where X
is the register that holds the outputs (xi), and i and j are selected uniformly from
[N/t], [
√
t], respectively, using the seed S2.
S1 S2
CHSH⊗N
Xij
Z
S
Sub-block selectorX
Figure 5: The RUV sub-protocol. All arrows indicate classical operations performed by the referee.
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5 Analysis of the InfiniteExpansion Protocol
We now analyze the InfiniteExpansion protocol. As discussed in the Preliminaries (Section 3), we
will use the notation ρi and ρ f (or some variant thereof) to denote the state of the registers, devices,
eavesdroppers, etc., before and after the execution of a protocol, respectively. We will use the
following functions throughout this section: v(s) and r(s) to denote the output lengths of the
VV and RUV sub-protocols on inputs of length s, respectively (defined in Section 4). The output
length of the ClusterExpansion sub-protocol on an s-bit seed is g(s) := r(v(s)). We will use g(k)(s)
to denote the k-fold composition of g(s) (i.e. g(1)(s) = g(s), g(2)(s) = g(g(s)), etc.).
Theorem 5.1 establishes that there exists a quantum strategy by which the devices, with high
probability, do not abort the InfiniteExpansion protocol. Theorem 5.2 establishes the soundness of
the InfiniteExpansion protocol.
Theorem 5.1 (Completeness of the InfiniteExpansion protocol). There exists a non-signalling quantum
strategy for devices D1, . . . ,D8, such that the probability that the referee aborts in any round i in the exe-
cution of the InfiniteExpansion(C1,C2, S) protocol is at most exp(−Ω(m1/3)), where C1 = {D1, . . . ,D4}
and C2 = {D5, . . . ,D8}, and S is a uniformly random m-bit seed that is secure against D1, . . . ,D8.
Proof. We group the devices into pairs {D1,D2}, {D3,D4}, {D5,D6}, and {D7,D8}, where pairs
{D1,D2} and {D5,D6}will instantiate the ideal devices for the VV protocol (see [VV12a] for more
details), and the pairs {D3,D4} and {D7,D8} will instantiate the ideal devices for the RUV pro-
tocol (i.e. use the ideal CHSH strategy in every round). Fix a round i and assume, without loss
of generality, that the referee interacts with the pairs {D1,D2} (used for the VV protocol) and
{D3,D4} (used for the RUV protocol) in round i. The probability that {D1,D2} abort the VV proto-
col is at most exp(−Ω(m2/3i )), and the probability that {D3,D4} abort the RUV protocol is at most
exp(−Ω(m1/3i )), where mi = g(i)(m). Thus, by the union bound, the probability of aborting any
round i is at most exp(−Ω(m1/3)).
Theorem 5.2 (Soundness of the InfiniteExpansion protocol). Let C0 and C1 be non-signaling Expansion
Clusters. Suppose that a classical referee executes the InfiniteExpansion(C0,C1, S) protocol, where S denotes
the referee’s classical register that holds an m-bit seed. Let WINi to be the event that the referee did not
abort the InfiniteExpansion protocol in the ith round, and let WIN≤i = WIN1 ∧ · · · ∧WINi. Let E be an
arbitrary quantum system that may be entangled with C0 and C1, but cannot communicate with C0 and
C1 once the protocol has started. Let ρ
0
SC0C1
denote the initial joint state of the seed and the clusters. If
ρSC0C1 = Um ⊗ ρC0C1 , then we have for all k ∈ N that if Pr(WIN≤k) ≥ λ ≥ exp(−C′m1/3) for some
universal constant C′, then
‖ρkXkE −Ug(k)(m) ⊗ ρkE‖tr ≤ 4 exp(−C′′m1/3)/λ2,
where
• C′′ is the universal constant from Theorem 5.3, and
• ρkXkE denotes the joint state of the referee’s Xk register and E after k rounds of the InfiniteExpansion(C0,C1)
Protocol, conditioned on the eventWIN≤k.
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Before presenting the proof of Theorem 5.2, we wish to direct the reader’s attention to the Input
Security of the InfiniteExpansion protocol: the assumption on the initial seed is that it is in tensor
product with the cluster devices only, and not the eavesdropper E – however, the output at each
iteration is close to being in tensor product with the eavesdropper E.
The proof of Theorem 5.2 assumes the correctness of the ClusterExpansion sub-protocol (Theo-
rem 5.3), and shows that the InfiniteExpansion protocol maintains the property that at each iteration
i, the output of X of cluster Ci (where Ci denotes Expansion Cluster Ci mod 2) is approximately se-
cure against the other cluster Ci+1. Thus, the the execution of the ClusterExpansion sub-protocol
with Ci+1, conditioned on not aborting, will continue to produce a nearly uniform output. Fur-
thermore, the errors accumulate linearly with each iteration.
Proof. Define Cj := Cj mod 2. Divide the overall probability of success, Pr(WIN≤k), into condi-
tional probabilities: let p = Pr(WIN≤k) and let pi = Pr(WINi|WIN≤i−1). Observe that we have
p = ∏ pi ≥ λ. We prove the claim by induction.
The inductive hypothesis: Recursively define δ(i) := εEC(g
(i−1)(m), pi) + δ(i − 1)/pi, where
δ(1) := εEC(m, p1) and εEC(·) is the error bound given by Theorem 5.3. For all i = 1, . . . , k − 1,
there exists a state µiXCiCi+1E such that µ
i
XiCi+1E
= Ug(i)(m) ⊗ µiCi+1E and
‖ρiXiCiCi+1E − µiXiCiCi+1E‖tr ≤ δ(i),
where ρiXiCiCi+1E is the joint state of the Xi register, both clusters Ci and Ci+1, and E after the ith
round, conditioned on WIN≤i.
Let k = 1. Then, by invoking Theorem 5.3 with C = C1, and treating the quantum eavesdropper
as C2 and E together, we obtain that there exists a state µ
1
X1C1C2E
such that µ1X1C2E = Ug(m) ⊗ µ1C2E,
and
‖ρ1X1C1C2E − µ1X1C1C2E‖tr ≤ εEC(m, p1) = δ(1).
This establishes the base case.
Now, suppose that we have run k − 1 rounds of the InfiniteExpansion protocol for some k > 1.
Using our inductive assumption for i = k − 1, we invoke Theorem 5.3 along with Lemma 3.3 to
conclude that there exists a state µkXkCkCk+1E such that µ
k
XkCk+1E
= Ug(k)(m)⊗ µkCk+1E and
‖ρkXkCkCk+1E − µkXkCkCk+1E‖tr ≤ εEC(g(k−1)(m), pk) + δ(k− 1)/pk := δ(k).
This completes the induction argument. We now bound δ(k):
δ(k) = εk +
1
pk
(
εk−1 +
1
pk−1
(εk−2 + · · · )
)
≤ 1
λ
(εk + εk−1 + · · ·+ ε1)
≤ 2ε1
λ
,
where we write ε i := εEC(g
(i)(m), pi), and use the facts that ∏ pi ≥ λ and each ε i is exponentially
smaller than ε i−1.
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Finally, for every k, we have that
‖ρkXkE −Ug(k)(m) ⊗ ρkE‖tr ≤ ‖ρkXkE − µkXkE‖tr + ‖µkXkE −Ug(k)(m) ⊗ ρkE‖tr
≤ δ(k) + ‖Ug(k)(m)⊗ µkE −Ug(k)(m) ⊗ ρkE‖tr
= δ(k) + ‖µkE − ρkE‖tr
≤ 2δ(k).
Next, we argue that the ClusterExpansion sub-protocol is an Input Secure randomness expansion
scheme. The correctness of the ClusterExpansion sub-protocol assumes the correctness of VV and
RUV protocols (Lemmas 5.4 and 5.5, respectively).
Theorem 5.3. Let C be an Expansion Cluster. Suppose that a classical referee executes the ClusterExpansion(C, S)
protocol, where S denotes the referee’s classical register that holds an m-bit seed. Let E be an arbitrary quan-
tum system that may be entangled with C, but cannot communicate with C once the protocol has started.
If ρiSC = Um ⊗ ρiC, and Pr(ClusterExpansion(C, S) succeeds) ≥ λ ≥ exp(−C′m1/3) for some universal
constant C′, then there exists a state τXCE such that τXE = Ug(m)⊗ τE and
‖ρ fXCE − τXCE‖tr ≤ εEC(m,λ),
where εEC(m,λ) := exp(−C′′m1/3)/λ for some universal constant C′′, and ρ fXCE is the joint state of the
protocol’s output X, the cluster C, and E conditioned on the protocol ClusterExpansion(C, S) succeeding.
Proof. Let λ1 denote the probability that Step 1 of ClusterExpansion(C, S) succeeds, and let λ2 de-
note the probability that Step 2 of ClusterExpansion(C, S) succeeds, conditioned on Step 1 succeed-
ing, so that λ1λ2 ≥ λ. Let C consist of devices D = {D1,D2} and G = {G1,G2}, where the
Di’s are used for execution of the VV protocol, and the Gj’s are used for the execution of the RUV
protocol. Let Y be the output of VV(D1,D2, S) (which is Step 1 of ClusterExpansion(C, S)). By defi-
nition of the VV protocol, |Y| = v(m). By Lemma 5.4 and our assumption on S (in particular, that
ρiSDG = Um ⊗ ρiDG), there exists a state τvYDGE such that τvYG = Uv(m) ⊗ τvG and
‖ρvYDGE − τvYDGE‖tr ≤ εVV(m), (1)
where ρv denotes the state of the system after running the VV protocol (and conditioned on it suc-
ceeding) but before executing theRUV protocol, and εVV(·) is the error bound given by Lemma 5.4.
Let X be the output of RUV(G1,G2,Y) (which is Step 2 of ClusterExpansion(C, S)). By definition of
the RUV protocol, |X| = r(|Y|) = r(v(m)).
Imagine that we executed the RUV protocol on the “ideal” input τvYDGE. By Lemma 5.5, we would
get that there existed a state τ
f
XDGE such that τ
f
XE = Ug(m) ⊗ τ fE , and
‖ρ fXDGE − τ fXDGE‖tr ≤ εRUV(v(m),λ2),
where εRUV(·, ·) is the error bound given by Lemma 5.5. However, we only have the approximate
guarantee on Y given by (1). So, by Lemma 3.3, we instead get that there exists a state τ
f
XDGE such
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that τ
f
XE = Ug(m) ⊗ τ fE , and
‖ρ fXDGE − τ fXDGE‖tr ≤ εRUV(v(m),λ2) +
εVV(m)
λ2
.
Plugging in the expressions for εRUV and εVV, we get that this is at most
1
λ2
(
√
192(v(m)/4)−1/(8α) +
√
3 exp(−C′m1/3)) ≤ exp(−C′′m1/3)/λ,
for some universal constant C′′.
5.1 Analysis of the VV protocol
In the next two sections, we analyze that the VV and the RUV components of the ClusterExpansion
sub-protocol. As discussed in the introduction, the VV protocol in a cluster C will provide near-
exponential randomness expansion, although the analysis of [VV12a] does not allow us to con-
clude that the output is secure against the other cluster C′ (i.e. the Input Security Problem) 8. The
RUV protocol in C will be used to transform the output of VV to be secure against C′. Observe
that, qualitatively, the RUV protocol solves the Input Security Problem because in Lemma 5.5, the
random seed is not required to be secure against an eavesdropper, yet the output is guaranteed to
be! On the other hand, Lemma 5.4 below requires the assumption that the seed to the VV protocol
is secure against the protocol’s devices and the eavesdropper simultaneously.
Lemma 5.4. Let D1,D2 be non-signaling quantum devices. Suppose that a classical referee executes the
VV(D1,D2, S) protocol, where S denotes the referee’s classical register that holds an m-bit seed. Let E be
an arbitrary quantum system that may be entangled with D1 and D2, but cannot communicate with them
once the protocol begins. If the initial joint state of S, D1, D2, and E is ρ
0
SD1D2E
= Um ⊗ ρ0D1D2E, and if
Pr(VV(D1,D2, S) succeeds) ≥ exp(−C′m1/3) for some universal constant C′, then there exists a state
τXDE where τXE = Uv(m)⊗ ρ fE and
‖ρ fXDE − τXDE‖tr ≤ εVV(m),
where ρ
f
XDE is the joint state of E, the devices D = {D1,D2}, and the output X of the protocol conditioned
on the VV(D1,D2, S) protocol succeeding, εVV(m) =
√
3 exp(−C′m1/3), and v(m) = exp(C′m1/3)/2.
Proof. The VV protocol consists of two parts, executing Protocol B of [VV12a] using half of the seed
S (which we denote by S1) to produce an output Y of length exp(Ω(m
1/3)) which contains high
min-entropy (conditioned on Protocol B not aborting), and then applying a randomness extractor
using Y as the source, and the other half of S (which we denote by S2) as the extractor seed, to
produce an output X that is close to uniform.
Let ρvYE denote the joint state of the output of Protocol B (Step 2 of the VV protocol) and the
eavesdropper E, conditioned on Protocol B not aborting. Then, by our assumption on S and by
Theorem 3.4, we get that Hε∞(Y|E)ρv ≥ h(m), where h(m) = exp(C′m1/3) and ε = ε(m) = 1/h(m)
for a universal constant C′.
8See 2.2 for more about this issue.
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The VV protocol then applies a quantum-secure randomness extractor to the source Y, with seed
S2. The protocol uses theQExt : {0, 1}|Y|×{0, 1}d(m) → {0, 1}h(m)/2 randomness extractor promised
by Theorem 3.6, where d(m) = Θ(m). Let ρ˜YE be a cq-state that is ε-close to ρ
v
YE in trace distance,
and is such that H∞(Y|E)ρ˜ ≥ h(m) 9. Then, since QExt is a (h(m), ε)-quantum-secure extractor,
we have that
‖ρ˜XE −Uv(m)⊗ ρ˜E‖tr ≤ ε, (2)
where ρ˜XE is the joint state of the outputX of the extractorQExt and E, with ρ˜Y as the source. View
the application of QExt to the Y and S2 register as a trace-preserving quantum operation E , which
takes states ρvYS2 and outputs states ρ
f
QExt(Y,S2)
. Then, by the triangle inequality, we have
‖E ⊗ 1E(ρvYS2E)−Uv(m)⊗ ρ
f
E‖tr ≤‖E ⊗ 1E(ρvYS2E)− E ⊗ 1E(ρ˜YS2E)‖tr+
‖E ⊗ 1E(ρ˜YS2E)−Uv(m) ⊗ ρ˜E‖tr+
‖Uv(m) ⊗ ρ˜E −Uv(m)⊗ ρ fE‖tr.
Since E is trace-preserving, we can bound the first term by ε. The second term is bounded by ε
via equation (2). The third term is bounded by ε because the trace distance is non-increasing with
respect to the partial trace. Thus,
‖ρ fXE −Uv(m)⊗ ρ fE‖tr = ‖E ⊗ 1E(ρvYS2E)−Uv(m)⊗ ρ
f
E‖tr ≤ 3ε.
We then apply Lemma B.2 to obtain that there exists a state τXDE such that τXE = Uv(m)⊗ ρ fE and
‖ρ fXDE − τXDE‖tr ≤
√
3ε.
which proves the claim.
5.2 Analysis of the RUV protocol
In this section, we analyze the RUV protocol. Before stating Lemma 5.5, it will be necessary to give
formal and precise definitions of several (classical) random variables, and how they interact with
the relevant quantum states.
Let S be an m-bit seed used in the RUV protocol, performed with non-signaling devices D1 and
D2. Half of S, call it S1, is used for N CHSH games, where N = m/4. Recall that we divide the N
CHSH games into blocks of t = N1/α consecutive games. Define the following random variables:
1. Let F denote the indicator variable that is 1 iff the RUV protocol doesn’t abort in Step 4 (i.e.
the devices win ≈ cos2(pi/8)N CHSH games). Note that F is a deterministic function of the
devices’ outputs and S1.
2. For all i ∈ [N/t], let Ii denote the indicator variable that is 1 iff the devices D1 and D2 used a
ζ-ideal strategy to produce their outputs in the ith block of CHSH games, where ζ := κ∗t−κ∗
(see Section 3 and [RUV12] for more details about ideal strategies).
9Although the definition of smoothed min-entropy quantifies over all density states in the ε-ball around ρYE, there
exists a cq-state with high min-entropy in the ε-ball – see, e.g., [Ren08].
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3. Let H denote the indicator variable that is 1 iff G ≥ (1 − ν)N/t, where G := ∑ Ii and
ν := (12/
√
2)
√
logNt/N1/4 ≤ t−α/8.
In our proof of Claim 5.5, we will consider states such as ρFIiXDE, where X denotes the output of
device D1 after N CHSH games, D denotes the devices D1 and D2 together, E denotes an arbitrary
quantum system, F will contain the classical bit indicating whether the devices aborted the RUV
protocol or not, and Ii will contain a classical bit denoting whether the devices used a ζ-ideal
strategy for block i. Because F and Ii are classical variables, ρFIiXDE is a cccqq-state, and thus there
is an ensemble {ρ f qxDE } that represents the states of the D and E systems conditioned on the classical
events F = f , Ii = q, and X = x, where
ρFIiXDE := ∑
f ,q,x
Pr(F = f , Ii = q,X = x)| f 〉〈 f |F ⊗ |q〉〈q|Ii ⊗ |x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρ f qxDE .
Thus, we can meaningfully condition the state ρFIiXDE on various values of F and Ii. For example,
when we refer to the state ρXE|F=1, we mean the state that is, up to a normalization factor,
∑
q
Pr(F = 1, Ii = q,X = x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρ1qxDE .
In particular, we will make use of the fact that ρXE|F=1 = Pr(Ii = 0|F = 1)ρXE|Ii=0,F=1 + Pr(Ii =
1|F = 1)ρXE|Ii=1,F=1, where ρXE|Ii=q,F=1 is defined similarly to ρXE|F=1.
Lemma 5.5. Let D1,D2 be non-signaling quantum devices. Suppose that a classical referee executes the
RUV(D1,D2, S) protocol, where S denotes the referee’s classical register that holds an m-bit seed. Let E
be an arbitrary quantum system that may be entangled with D1 and D2, but cannot communicate with
them once the protocol begins. If the initial joint state of S, D1, and D2 is ρ
i
SD1D2
= Um ⊗ ρiD1D2 , and
Pr(RUV(D1,D2, S) succeeds) ≥ λ, then, we have that there exists a state τZDE where τZE = Ur(m) ⊗ τE,
and
‖ρ f
ZDE|F=1 − τZDE‖tr ≤ εRUV(m,λ),
where εRUV(m,λ) ≤
√
192(m/4)−1/(8α)/λ, and where ρ f
ZDE|F=1 is the joint state of E, the devices D =
{D1,D2}, and the output Z of the protocol, conditioned on F = 1 (i.e. the RUV(D1,D2, S) protocol does
not abort).
Proof. Let ρiXDFE be the joint state of the X, D, F, and E registers before the N CHSH games are
played (so X and F are initialized to the all 0 state). For this proof, we will assume that E is such
that ρiXDFE is a pure state. This is without loss of generality, because we can take a non-pure state
ρiXDFE and augment it with some extension E
′ ⊃ E such that ρiXDFE′ is pure (e.g. via a purification
of the state ρiXDFE). Observe that ‖ρ fZE′ |F=1 − Ur(m) ⊗ ρ
f
E′|F=1‖tr ≤ ε implies ‖ρ
f
ZE|F=1 − Ur(m) ⊗
ρ
f
E|F=1‖tr ≤ ε, because the trace distance is non-increasing under discarding the augmented system
E′\E.
For notational clarity, we shall omit the superscripts i and f , because we focus on the state ρFSXDE
of the system after the N CHSH games (i.e. the X register holds the output of device D1), but before
conditioning on F = 1 and before using the seed S2 to select a sub-block. The ith block of X will be
denoted Xi, and the j
th sub-block of the ith block will be denoted Xij.
There are two main components to this proof.
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1. We argue that, for the state ρXE|F=1, there is a 1− δ fraction of sub-blocks Xij such that
‖ρXijE|F=1−U√t ⊗ ρE|F=1‖tr ≤ η,
where we set η and δ later in the proof. We say that such sub-blocks are η-good with respect
to E.
2. We argue that the string S2 (substring of the seed S used to select the sub-block thatRUV(D1,D2, S)
will output) is in tensor product with a string describing the locations of the η-good sub-
blocks of the state ρXE|F=1.
In particular, let Z := XS2 denote the sub-block selected by string S2. From the above two compo-
nents, it follows that, for the state ρXE|F=1, the the random variable Z is (η + δ)-good with respect
to E, i.e.,
‖ρZE|F=1 −U√t ⊗ ρE|F=1‖tr ≤ η + δ.
We then invoke Lemma B.2 to argue that there exists a state τZDE such that τZE = U√t ⊗ ρE|F=1
and
‖ρZDE|F=1 − τZDE‖tr ≤
√
η + δ,
and we are done. We now proceed to proving the first two components.
There are many good sub-blocks. By the definition of Ii and Lemma 3.7,
‖ρXiE|Ii=1−Ut ⊗ ρE|Ii=1‖tr ≤ ζ.
It follows by Proposition 5.6 that, for at least a 1− t−1/4 fraction of sub-blocks j of block i we have
that
‖ρXijEF|Ii=1 −U√t ⊗ ρEF|Ii=1‖tr ≤ µ,
where µ := 2(
√
ζ + t−1/8). If we then condition on the event F = 1 it follows that
‖ρXijE|Ii=1,F=1−U√t ⊗ ρE|Ii=1,F=1‖tr ≤
µ
Pr(F = 1)
≤ µ
λ
(3)
We wish to establish the above statement for the state ρXijE|F=1 rather than the state ρXijE|Ii=1,F=1.
The key to making this transition is to establish that, for many values of i, the event F = 1 is
approximately a sub-event of the event Ii = 1. To do so, it is helpful to consider the event H = 1.
Let M := N/t denote the number of blocks of CHSH games. It follows from the definition of
H that ∑i∈[M] E[Ii = 0|H = 1] ≤ νM. Thus, by Markov’s inequality we have that at most a
√
ν
fraction of blocks i ∈ [M] are such that Pr(Ii = 0|H = 1) >
√
ν. Thus, at least a 1−√ν fraction of
blocks i ∈ [M] have Pr(Ii = 0|H = 1) ≤
√
ν.
Consider such a block i. Note that by Theorem 3.8, Pr(H = 0, F = 1) ≤ t−2. Thus
Pr(Ii = 0, F = 1) = Pr(Ii = 0|H = 1, F = 1)Pr(H = 1, F = 1) + Pr(Ii = 0|H = 0, F = 1)Pr(H = 0, F = 1)
≤ Pr(Ii = 0|H = 1, F = 1) + Pr(Ii = 0|H = 0, F = 1)t−2
≤ Pr(Ii = 0|H = 1)
Pr(F = 1)
+ t−2
≤
√
ν
λ
+ t−2.
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Since Ii = 1 is a classical event, we have ρXE|F=1 = (1 − τ)ρXE|Ii=1,F=1 + τρXE|Ii=0,F=1, where
τ := Pr(Ii = 0|F = 1). Thus,
‖ρXiE|F=1− ρXiE|Ii=1,F=1‖tr = ‖(−τ)ρXiE|Ii=1,F=1 + τρXiE|Ii=0,F=1‖tr
≤ τ(‖ρXiE|Ii=1,F=1‖tr + ‖ρXiE|Ii=0,F=1‖tr)
≤ 2τ.
By definition, τ = Pr(Ii = 0, F = 1)/Pr(F = 1). Thus,
‖ρXiE|Ii=1,F=1− ρXiE|F=1‖tr ≤ 2
√
ν + λt−2
λ2
By tracing over all except the jth sub-block we get
‖ρXijE|Ii=1,F=1− ρXijE|F=1‖tr ≤ 2
√
ν + λt−2
λ2
(4)
By tracing over the entire Xi register we get
‖ρE|Ii=1,F=1− ρE|F=1‖tr ≤ 2
√
ν + λt−2
λ2
(5)
Thus, at least a (1− t−1/4)(1−√ν) of all the sub-blocks Xij have the property that equations (3),
(5), and (4) all hold. It follows by the triangle inequality that
‖ρXijE|F=1−U√t ⊗ ρE|F=1‖tr ≤ ‖ρXijE|F=1− ρXijE|Ii=1,F=1‖tr + ‖ρXijE|Ii=1,F=1−U√t ⊗ ρE|Ii=1,F=1‖tr
+ ‖U√t ⊗ ρE|Ii=1,F=1−U√t ⊗ ρE|F=1‖tr
≤ 2
√
ν + λt−2
λ2
+
µ
λ
+ ‖ρE|Ii=1,F=1− ρE|F=1‖tr
≤ 4
(√
ν + λt−2
λ2
)
+
µ
λ
≤ 96
λ
t−1/8. (6)
Define η := 96t−1/8/λ. Thus, we have that at least a 1− δ fraction of the sub-blocks Xij are η-
good with respect to E, where δ := t−1/4 +
√
ν ≤ 2t−1/4. It is easy to see that η + δ ≤ 2η =
192(m/4)−1/(8α)/λ.
S2 is secure against the location of good sub-blocks. Although we have established that most
of the sub-blocks of X are η-good, we need to show that the seed S2 used to select the sub-block
for the output of the RUV protocol is independent of the locations of the good sub-blocks (i.e.
the indices i, j such that Xij is η-good with respect to E). A priori, since S2 is entangled with the
eavesdropper E (because S2 was the output of a different expansion cluster), it could be that S2
was somehow adversarially generated to select a bad sub-block. Here, we show that this cannot
happen, because the locations of the good sub-blocks can be locally computed by the devices D =
{D1,D2}. Since ρiSD = Um ⊗ ρiD (where ρiD := ρD1D2), S2 is independent of the good sub-block
locations.
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Consider the following thought experiment: the system D = {D1,D2} is augmented with a clas-
sical description ∆ of the state ρiXFD, and a register Λ that will store the locally computed location
of the good sub-blocks, so that we have a new system D′ = {D1,D2,∆,Λ}. Throughout the RUV
protocol, the D′ system cannot communicate with the eavesdropper system E. At the beginning of
the RUV protocol, we have that ρSD′ = U|S| ⊗ ρD′ . Imagine that we have measured the S1 register
(but the S2 register remains unmeasured), so that it is now a deterministic value s1. Let Es1 denote
the quantum operation that acts on the systems D1, D2, F that represents the strategy employed
by devices D1 and D2, on the inputs determined by s1, for the N CHSH games (Step 3 of the RUV
protocol). That is, ρ
f
XFD := Es1(ρiXFD).
As part of this thought experiment, we imagine that, after the N CHSH games, the ∆ system
performs a quantum operation Ss1 on the ∆, and Λ systems (but not D1 and D2!) to classically
simulate the strategy used by the devices D1,D2 on input s1 in the N CHSH games, and compute
the location of the good sub-blocks. The ∆ will then contain a classical description of the state
ρ
f
XFD. Note that at this point, S2 is still secure against D
′; that is, we have
Ss1(Es1(ρiS2XFD∆Λ)) = U|S2| ⊗ Ss1(Es1(ρiXFD∆Λ)).
We elaborate on the classical simulation S . Given the classical description ∆ of ρiXFD, the location
of the good sub-blocks can be computed by using ∆ in the following way:
1. Compute the classical description of a purification σiXFDE′ of the state ρ
i
XFD. Note that in gen-
eral, σiXFDE′ is different from the “real” state ρ
i
XFDE , because the ∆ system has no knowledge
of the external system E.
2. Classically simulate the devices’ strategy E on the state σiXFDE′ , i.e.,
σ
f
XFDE′ = Es1(σiXFDE′).
Note that σ
f
XFD = ρ
f
XFD.
3. Compute the indices i, j, such that
‖σ f
XijE′|F=1−U√t ⊗ σ
f
E′|F=1‖tr ≤ η,
and store those indices in a register Λ.
We now argue that Λ will contain an accurate description of the locations of the η-good sub-blocks
in the “real” state ρ
f
XFDE. From this, since ρ
f
S2Λ
= ρ
f
S2
⊗ ρ f
Λ
, it follows that S2 is independent of the
good sub-block locations.
Here we will use the assumption, stated at the beginning of this proof, that ρiXFDE is a pure state.
Let ρiXFDE := |ψ〉〈ψ|, and let σiXFDE′ := |φ〉〈φ|. There exists a unitary V that takes the E system
to the E′ system and acts as the identity on all other systems, such that |φ〉 = V|ψ〉. Since V
and Es1 act on different systems, they commute, and hence σ fXFDE′ = Vρ
f
XFDEV
†. Furthermore, V
commutes with the projector ΠF=1 that projects onto the F = 1 subspace, and thus
σ
f
XDE′|F=1 = Vρ
f
XDE|F=1V
†.
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Thus,
‖σ f
XijE′|F=1−U√t ⊗ σ
f
E′|F=1‖tr = ‖tr 6=(i,j),D(Vρ
f
XDE|F=1V
†)−U√t ⊗ trXD(Vρ fXDE|F=1V†)‖tr
= ‖V
(
tr 6=(i,j),D(ρ
f
XDE|F=1)−U√t ⊗ trXD(ρ
f
XDE|F=1)
)
V†‖tr
= ‖tr 6=(i,j),D(ρ fXDE|F=1)−U√t ⊗ trXD(ρ
f
XDE|F=1)‖tr
= ‖ρ f
XijE|F=1−U√t ⊗ ρ
f
E|F=1‖tr,
where tr 6=(i,j),D indicates tracing out over all sub-blocks except for the jth one in the ith block, and
the system D. The second equality follows from the fact that V and the partial trace commute.
The third equality follows because the trace norm is unitarily invariant.
Thus, the indices i, j where ‖σ f
XijE′|F=1 −U√t ⊗ σ
f
E′|F=1‖tr ≤ η are exactly those sub-blocks that are
η-good in the state ρ
f
XFDE.
Proposition 5.6. Let i ∈ [N/t] be the index of a block. If
‖ρXiE|Ii=1−Ut ⊗ ρE|Ii=1‖ ≤ ζ,
then for at least a 1− t−1/4 fraction of sub-blocks j of block i we have that
‖ρXijEF|Ii=1 −U√t ⊗ ρEF|Ii=1‖ ≤ 2(
√
ζ + t−1/8).
Proof. By Lemma B.2, there exists a state σXiFE such that σXiE = Ut ⊗ ρE|Ii=1, and ‖ρXiFE|Ii=1 −
σXiFE‖tr ≤
√
ζ. Let R :=
√
t denote the number of sub-blocks in a block. We now prove the
Proposition by showing that, for the state σXiFE, at least 1− t−1/4 fraction of sub-block indices
j ∈ [R] satisfy I(Xij : FE)σ ≤ 2t−1/4. For such j, we obtain:
‖ρXijFE|Ii=1−U√t ⊗ ρFE|Ii=1‖tr ≤ ‖ρXijFE|Ii=1 − σXijFE‖tr + ‖σXijFE −U√t ⊗ σFE‖tr
+ ‖U√t ⊗ σFE −U√t ⊗ ρFE|Ii=1‖tr
≤
√
ζ +
√
4t−1/4 +
√
ζ.
The bound on the second term in the second inequality is given via Pinsker’s Inequality (see
Fact 3.2), which states that ‖σXijFE −U√t ⊗ σFE‖tr ≤
√
2I(Xij : FE)σ. The bounds on the first and
third terms come from the fact that the trace distance is non-increasing with respect to the partial
trace.
Thus we focus on analyzing the state σXiFE for the remainder of this proof. We apply the chain
rule to obtain I(Xi : FE)σ = ∑j I(Xij : FE|Xi,<j)σ. This is equivalent to
Ej[I(Xij : FE|Xi,<j)σ] = 1
R
I(Xi : FE)σ,
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where Xi,<j denotes all the Xik such that k < j. Wewill omit the subscript σ because the underlying
state is clear from context. We upper-bound the quantity I(Xi : FE) via the following calculation:
I(Xi : FE) = H(Xi)− H(Xi|FE) (7)
= H(Xi)− (H(XiFE)− H(FE)) (8)
= H(Xi)− (H(XiFE)− H(E)− H(F|E)) (9)
= H(Xi)− (H(XiE) + H(F|XiE)− H(E)− H(F|E)) (10)
= H(Xi)− (H(Xi) + H(E) + H(F|XiE)− H(E)− H(F|E)) (11)
= H(F|E)− H(F|XiE) (12)
≤ 2H(F) (13)
≤ 2 (14)
Equation (7) is the definition of mutual information. Equations (8), (9), and (10) follow from the
definition of conditional mutual entropy. Equation (11) follows from our assumption that σXiE =
σXi ⊗ σE. Equation (13) follows from the fact that conditioning can only reduce entropy, and that
−H(F|XiE) ≤ H(F).
We now lower bound the individual terms of the expectation I(Xij : FE|Xi,<j).
I(Xij : FE|Xi,<j) = H(Xij|Xi,<j)− H(Xij|FEXi,<j) (15)
≥ H(Xij)− H(Xij|FE) (16)
= I(Xij : FE). (17)
Equation (15) is the definition of conditional mutual information. Equation (16) follows because
σXi = Ut (hence σXij is in tensor product with σXi,<j), and conditioning can only reduce entropy.
Finally, equation (17) is again the definition of mutual information.
Thus,
Ej[I(Xij : FE)] ≤ 2
R
,
and by Markov’s inequality, we get that 1− µ fraction of j’s are such that I(Xij : FE) ≤ 2µR . Setting
µ = t−1/4 completes the proof.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a randomness expansion protocol that achieves infinite expansion: starting
withm bits of uniform seed, the protocol produces an arbitrarily long output string that is exp(−Ω(m 13 ))-
close to uniform. Furthermore, this protocol only requires eight non-signaling quantum devices
(and can be performed with just six devices using a simple modification). In order to accomplish
this we design an Input Secure adaptive randomness expansion protocol, which is then used as a
sub-protocol in the infinite expansion protocol. We suspect that the existence of Input Secure ran-
domness expansion protocols is also of independent interest. As evidence of their independent
interest we note that Input Secure protocols play a key role as a building block in [CSW14], where
they were discovered independently from this work, and used to design a protocol for seedless
randomness amplification from any min-entropy source (see Section 2.2).
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A Proof of Lemma 3.3
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Define µXDE to be the state τXDE as given by the assumption in the lemma on
input σFSXDE where σFSXD = σFSX ⊗ σD. By the triangle inequality, we have:
‖ρ fXDE − µXDE‖tr ≤‖FE ⊗ 1E(ρiFSXDE)−FE ⊗ 1E(σFSXDE)‖tr (18)
+ ‖FE ⊗ 1E(σFSXDE)− µXDE‖tr.
We bound the first term on the right hand side:
‖FE ⊗ 1E(ρiFSXDE)−FE ⊗ 1E(σFSXDE)‖tr ≤
1
λ
‖E ⊗ 1E(ρiFSXDE)− E ⊗ 1E(σFSXDE)‖tr
≤ 1
λ
‖ρiFSXDE − σFSXDE‖tr
≤ δ/λ.
Let λ′ denote the probability that the F register of the state E ⊗ 1E(σFSXDE), when measured,
has outcome |1〉. Note that max{λ,λ′} ≥ λ, so the first inequality follows from Lemma B.1.
The second inequality follows because trace-preserving quantum operations are contractive with
respect to the trace distance. The final inequality comes from our assumption on ρiFSXDE.
The second term on the right hand side of (18) is bounded by ε from our assumption on the
quantum operation FE .
B Useful lemmata
Lemma B.1. Let ρFQ, σFQ be cq-states on the same classical-quantum Hilbert space HF ⊗HQ. Let E be
a set of outcomes of the F register such that min{Prρ(E), Prσ(E)} > 0, where Prρ(E), Prσ(E) denote the
probabilities of obtaining outcome E when measuring ρF and σF in the computational basis. Then,
‖ρFQ|E − σFQ|E‖tr ≤
‖ρFQ − σFQ‖tr
max{Prρ(E), Prσ(E)} ,
where ρFQ|E and σFQ|E denote the post-measurement state of ρFQ and σFQ, respectively, conditioned on E.
Proof. We use the operational interpretation of the trace norm of two quantum states, namely, that
‖ρ − σ‖tr = maxA Pr(A(ρ) = 1) − Pr(A(σ) = 1), where ρ and σ are arbitrary density matrices,
and the maximization is over all possible 0/1-valued POVMs A.
Let λρ and λσ denote Prρ(E) and Prσ(E) respectively. We consider two cases: λρ ≥ λσ and λρ < λσ.
Take the first case.
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Consider the following two-outcome experiment A that tries to distinguish between ρFQ and σFQ.
We first measure the F register in the computational basis. If the outcome E does not occur, we
output “0”. Suppose outcome E does occur. Let B be the optimal two-outcome POVM such that
Pr(B(ρFQ|E) = 1) − Pr(B(σFQ|E) = 1) = ‖ρFQ|E − σFQ|E‖tr. We then make the measurement
dictated by B on the post-measurement state (which is either ρFQ|E or σFQ|E), and output “1” iff B
outputs “1′′. Then, we have that
‖ρFQ − σFQ‖tr ≥ Pr(A(ρFQ) = 1)− Pr(A(σFQ) = 1)
= λρ Pr(B(ρFQ|E) = 1)− λσ Pr(B(σFQ|E) = 1)
= λρ
(‖ρFQ|E − σFQ|E‖tr + Pr(B(σFQ|E) = 1))− λσ Pr(B(σFQ|E) = 1).
Solving for ‖ρFQ|E − σFQ|E‖tr, we get that
‖ρFQ|E − σFQ|E‖tr ≤
‖ρFQ − σFQ‖tr − β(λρ − λσ)
λρ
≤ ‖ρFQ − σFQ‖tr
λρ
≤ ‖ρFQ − σFQ‖tr
max{λρ,λσ} ,
where β := Pr(B(σFQ|E) = 1). In the other case, we have that λρ < λσ. We can then switch the
order of ρFQ and σFQ in the previous argument, and obtain that
‖ρFQ|E − σFQ|E‖tr ≤
‖ρFQ − σFQ‖tr
λσ
≤ ‖ρFQ − σFQ‖tr
max{λρ,λσ} .
Lemma B.2. Let ρA1A2B ∈ D(HA1 ⊗HA2 ⊗HB), and σA1A2 ∈ D(HA1 ⊗HA2) be such that ρA1A2B
is a cqq-state, σA1A2 is a cq-state, and ‖ρA1A2 − σA1A2‖tr ≤ ε. Then there exists a cqq-state τA1A2B ∈
D(HA1 ⊗HA2 ⊗HB) such that τA1A2 = σA1A2 and ‖ρA1A2B − τA1A2B‖tr ≤
√
ε.
Proof. For notational brevity we will let A = {A1, A2} so ρAB := ρA1A2B and σA := σA1A2 .
Let F(ρ, σ) denote the fidelity between two quantum states ρ and σ. By Uhlmann’s Theorem,
there exists purifications ρAQ := |ψ〉〈ψ| and σAQ := |φ〉〈φ| of ρA and σA, respectively, such that
F(ρA, σA) = |〈ψ|φ〉| [Wil13]. But by the Fuchs-van de Graaf inequalities, we also have that
F(ρA, σA) ≥ 1 − ‖ρA − σA‖tr/2 ≥ 1 − ε/2 [Wil13]. Since ‖ρAQ − σAQ‖tr =
√
1− |〈ψ|φ〉|2, we
have that
‖ρAQ − σAQ‖tr ≤
√
ε.
Let ρABR = |θ〉〈θ| be a purification of the state ρAB. Since ρABR and ρAQ are both purifications
of the state ρA, there exists a unitary map V that takes the Q space to the BR space such that
ρABR = VρAQV
†. Define τ′ABR := VσAQV
†. Then, by the unitary invariance of the trace norm, we
have that
‖ρABR − τ′ABR‖tr = ‖VρAQV† −Vτ′AQV†‖tr
= ‖V(ρAQ − τ′AQ)V†‖tr
= ‖ρAQ − τ′AQ‖tr
≤ √ε.
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Since the trace norm cannot increase when discarding subsystems, we obtain ‖ρAB − τ′AB‖tr ≤
√
ε.
τ′AB = τ
′
A1A2B
is not guaranteed to be a cqq-state, but we can apply the trace-preserving quan-
tum map E that measures the A1 system in the computational basis and forgets the measurement
outcome. Let τA1A2B := E(τ′A1A2B), and observe that this is a cqq-state. Since ρA1A2B is already a
cqq-state, ρA1A2B = E(ρA1A2B). Because trace-preserving quantum maps are contractive under the
trace norm, we obtain ‖ρA1A2B − τA1A2B‖tr ≤
√
ε, and we are done.
C Parameter settings for the VV sub-protocol
For the sake of concreteness, we specify the settings of parameters to be used in the instantiation
of Protocol B of [VV12a] in our VV sub-protocol (see Section 4). We choose constants α,γ > 0 such
that γ ≤ 1/(10+ 8α). These constants are part of the definition of VV and will remain unchanged
for every instance of VV throughout the InfiniteExpansion protocol.
In [VV12a, Theorem 2], the parameter h specifies the min-entropy lower bound of Protocol B,
which in turn governs the length of the seed to Protocol B and length of the output. By definition
Protocol B implemented with parameter h requires at most K1γ
−3 log3(h) bits of seed for some
fixed constant K1 (this constant may depend on α, but since α is a global constant here, we ignore
this). When Protocol B is invoked by VV(A, B, S), we will set h =
⌊
2
γ
(
⌊s/2⌋ 1K1
)1/3⌋
, where s := |S|,
and it follows that Protocol B, with these parameters, will require no more than ⌊s/2⌋ bits of seed.
We will now discuss parameters relevant to the quantum extractor which will be used in VV.
Let us now define t := h
1
γ , C := ⌈100α⌉ and ε := 1h . The output of Protocol B is a bit string of
length n := ⌈10 log2(t)⌉ · ⌈Ct log2(t)⌉. By Theorem 3.6 there exists a function QExt : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}d → {0, 1} h2 that is a ( h2 +O(log
(
h
2
)
) +O(log 1/ε), ε)-quantum-secure extractor as long as
d ≥ O
(
log2(n/ε) log
(
h
2
))
= O
(
log3(h)
)
= O
(
γ3 ⌊s/2⌋ 1K1
)
. That is, as long as d ≥ K4γ3 ⌊s/2⌋ 1K1
for some fixed constant K4.
Thus, in specifying the VV sub-protocol and throughout the paper, we will set the following func-
tions, where s is the length of input to the VV sub-protocol:
• Min-entropy lower bound of Protocol B:
h(s) :=
⌊
2
γ
(
⌊s/2⌋ 1K1
)1/3⌋
.
• Output length of Protocol B:
n(s) :=
⌊
10C
(
s
2K1
)4/3
2(s/(2K1))
1/3
⌋
.
• Seed length of the extractor:
d(s) :=
⌈
K4
K1
γ3 ⌊s/2⌋
⌉
.
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• Output length of the extractor/VV sub-protocol:
v(s) := ⌊h(s)/2⌋.
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